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# U.S. halts secret training for Angola

## Congress to launch new probe of CIA African involvement

By David Anable

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

New York

The recruiting and training in this country of American veterans for mercenary operations in Angola have come to an abrupt halt, according to sources close to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

This is the apparent result of publication of an article in this newspaper late last week detailing these covert activities. The article received wide publicity and is believed to have prompted an urgent, high-level reassessment and clampdown.

After initial White House denials — later modified — this newspaper returned to its sources, who again confirmed last week's account.

The main thrust of recruitment now has moved to the other side of the Atlantic, these sources say, where certain African embassies in West European capitals are quietly recruiting Europeans, using American and other funds.

But the clampdown is not thought to have halted the operations of the 300 or so American mercenaries already in Angola. Their functions include direct combat, advice, and training of local indigenous forces.

### House committee acts

Other new developments:

• Monitor Washington correspondent Robert P. Hey reports it is known that one important House committee, which has probed past CIA activities, has responded to allegations in the Monitor article by calling the CIA in for questioning by committee staff behind closed doors this week. "We'll look into" all the allegations of increased CIA and U.S. involvement in the Angola war, says a key staff source.

The committee representatives plan to grill the CIA in detail on the extent of its role — direct or indirect. If this questioning yields "something earthshaking," then the committee can be expected to hold public hearings later this month. Otherwise information gleaned is likely to be released in a public report.

The committee plans to concentrate on two broad issues, correspondent Hey reports:

— In making any grants of money or weaponry to nations or groups which oppose the Soviet-backed MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola, could the CIA or the U.S. reasonably be expected to have known that this money would be used in Angola — perhaps in the training or equipping of mercenaries?

— Has the U.S. been helping train mercenaries in either of two ways: by direct aid to the CIA has led them to believe it was not involved in the Angolan war. If this committee finds the CIA knew — or ought to have known — that its aid would be used in Angola, then the committee and possibly the full Congress may feel itself deceived by the CIA.

facilities, or by sending American training specialists to foreign military bases or even to private property to conduct training there?

• The recruitment in the United States of American citizens for service in a foreign army is illegal under Title 18 of the United States code. It is known that the FBI and Justice Department are investigating a variety of alleged cases involving the recruitment of Americans for service in southern Africa.

• Sources close to Sen. John V. Tunney (D) of California, who was associated last month with Sen. Dick Clark (D) of Iowa in the fight against the U.S. involvement in Angola, said that the Senator is "very, very concerned" at the Monitor report. They said that the Senator believes it raises the basic question of how the CIA can be reined in.

Senator Tunney is described as planning two approaches to this issue:

One, to take a very hard look at every appropriations bill from now on in which funds might be hidden for covert use, starting with the foreign military assistance bill which comes onto the Senate floor soon.

Two, to seek further support for the resolution he introduced in the past session which would require members of Congress given secret briefings by the CIA to pass that information along to all those on their own congressional committees.

The article in last Friday's Monitor said that, according to senior mercenary officers close to the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA was, indirectly, recruiting American ex-servicemen, training them, dispatching them to southern Africa, contributing toward their pay, and providing them and the indigenous pro-Western forces in Angola with light and heavy weaponry.

### Administration backs off

Monitor Editor John Hughes said: "We believe our sources to be reliable, we have total confidence in our correspondent, and we stand by the Monitor story completely."

After an initial sharp reaction to the article, in which the CIA branded it as "nonsense" and the White House termed it as "without foundation," the administration later appeared to back off somewhat and began to issue far more qualified denials.

In answer to reporters' questions Friday, presidential spokesman Ron Nessen said: "No agency of the United States Government is using American mercenaries in Angola nor is any United States Government agency recruiting, hiring, or training mercenaries."

But when asked whether any private company or contractor might be doing so (a traditional covert method of CIA operation), Mr. Nessen said not "as far as I know."

Queried about U.S. funds being used for such purposes by foreign governments, Mr. Nessen said: "It is no secret that the American Government is giving modest amounts of assistance to some African countries; but I think it is fair to say that no U.S. Government agency has any way of knowing precisely how every last penny is spent of that assistance."

The possibility of any U.S. agency hiring non-American mercenaries. He declined to answer, saying he could not add to his first statement.

1 of 2

# ★ U.S. halts training for Angola

Continued

Later, in an interview Saturday with NBC, President Ford denied that the United States was training foreign mercenaries in Angola. He said, "We do expend some federal funds or United States funds in trying to be helpful; but we are not training foreign mercenaries."

The United States, said Mr. Ford, is "working with other countries that feel they have an interest in giving the Angolans an opportunity to make the decision for themselves, and I think this is a proper responsibility of the federal government."

In an effort to clarify these official statements, The Christian Science Monitor subsequently posed three specific questions to the White House:

1. Can you state categorically that there are no American mercenaries in Angola? Working for anyone?
2. Is any other agency or foreign government or faction or group either recruiting or hiring or training U.S. mercenaries for Angola?
3. The President said in his interview with NBC that the U.S. is not training foreign mercenaries in Angola — is the United States training either foreign or U.S. mercenaries anywhere else in the world for Angola?

Mr. Nessen, in reply, said once again that he could not go beyond his previous answers given on Friday nor beyond what President Ford said Saturday to NBC.

The whole issue of American involvement in Angola is highly sensitive at this moment, both domestically and internationally.

The U.S. Congress is expected to take up the whole question of U.S. covert assistance to the pro-West factions in Angola when it returns from its current recess.

## African nations to meet

On the international front, the Organization of African Unity is scheduled to meet late this week in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, first at foreign minister level, then at summit level. At least 16 of the OAU's 47 members have recognized the government set up in Luanda by the Soviet-backed MPLA. The question of further recognition of the MPLA by OAU members is expected to divide the Addis Ababa meeting with the dispute possibly centering on whether or not to offer the MPLA membership in the OAU.

The heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement on the MPLA side is more than offset in some black African eyes by the much less evident South African, and to a degree American, involvement on the side of two liberation movements fighting against the MPLA — the FNLA (National Front) and UNITA (National Union).

According to Monitor sources, the 300 or so Americans who last week had been poised to go to Angola as soon as the CIA could obtain the necessary funds, were virtually all former servicemen with combat experience in Indo-China.

These sources say that about half of this group underwent training on the sprawling Ft. Benning, Georgia, military area, during Christmas week.

## Ft. Benning

Ft. Benning is the headquarters of the 197th Infantry Brigade, of the U.S. Army Infantry School, and of the 8th Engineers. Training is conducted there also for Ranger and Airborne troops, including all elements of parachute jumping.

The vast training area is described by a U.S. military

source as having the right terrain for Africa. It has been used in the past for training foreign military personnel.

The same military source, describing the many big farms surrounding the area and the pro-military sentiments of the local population, stated that it was entirely possible for a group of mercenaries to train in the area with only minimal contact with the fort itself.

A public-affairs officer for the fort insisted at the weekend that there was no training whatsoever at the fort for mercenaries, foreign nationals, or retired or ex-U.S. personnel.

## Reports of recruiting

A number of reports have appeared in recent days and weeks about several different recruiting operations within the United States.

For instance, two members of the U.S. Cuban community in Florida claim to have 360 Cubans signed up and ready to go to Angola.

But although a number of Cubans are known to be eager to join mercenary groups in Angola if they could, well-informed sources within the Cuban community in Florida are highly skeptical of this particular operation, believing it to be a "ripoff."

Other reports have referred to the recruiting of black American ex-servicemen being carried out by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE).

But CORE spokesmen insist that their aim is simply to put together a group of medical volunteers for Angola and that their program is purely humanitarian.

## Real estate interests stop bill

By the Associated Press

Washington

A real estate interest group contributed more than \$100,000 to the campaigns of 100 House members who voted recently to kill an amendment that would have cracked down on real estate tax shelters, Common Cause says.

The public lobby group said the contributions were given to the congressmen during 1973 and 1974 by the Real Estate Political Education Committee.

The amendment in question was killed by the House on Dec. 4 by a vote of 226 to 192.

The amendment to the House tax bill, offered by Rep. Abner J. Mikva (D) of Illinois, would have raised the revenue-producing ability of a proposal that limits the use of tax shelters by real estate companies.

Mr. Mikva said his amendment would have required firms using such tax shelters to pay \$2.2 billion more in federal taxes over six years.

Common Cause said its study shows that between Sept. 1, 1973, and Dec. 31, 1974, 100 House members who opposed the Mikva amendment got a total of \$100,050 from the real estate political fund, while 31 who supported Mikva's proposal got \$19,550.

The group "contributed a total of over \$251,000 to federal candidates during the 1971 campaigns including \$61,000 to candidates for the Senate," Common Cause said.

"Of the seven Finance Committee senators who ran in 1974, five received contributions from the real estate political fund totaling \$19,200," Common Cause said. Chairman Russell B. Long (D) of Louisiana got \$2,000. Common Cause said.

# CIA Said Using Ex-GIs in Angola

The Christian Science Monitor reported today that 300 American ex-servicemen have been sent to Angola in the past three months and a similar number are trained and equipped to go there in a covert operation sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency.

A CIA spokesman refused to comment on the report but White House deputy press secretary John Carlson said "the story has no foundation and it is not true."

The Monitor report, quoting what it said were sources close to the CIA, said the U.S. mercenaries were being paid \$1,000 to \$1,500 a month and received a \$20,000 life insurance policy for helping two pro-West factions fighting a pro-Soviet faction in Angola.

In other Angolan developments:

—William Eteki Mboumoua, secretary general of the Organization of African Unity, sharply attacked South Africa for its involvement in Angola as his organization prepared to meet later this month on the matter.

—A Guyana spokesman said the United States was pressuring that nation on South America's Caribbean coast to refuse landing permission for Cuban planes supplying troops and supplies to aid Angolan pro-Communist forces.

—Intelligence sources in South Africa said the pro-Soviet movement controlling the Angolan capital at Luanda would launch an offensive within two weeks with fresh Cuban troops and a new squadron of Soviet jets.

—Guerrillas operating out of Angola killed a British immigrant and his African maid in a raid on the Namibian border town of Oshakati.

Angola

# Diplomacy on Angola Stressed

By Murrey Marder  
and Walter Pincus  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States is entrapping itself in "a no-win situation" in Angola, a senior Republican said yesterday, as Ford administration officials pinned their prime hopes on a diplomatic solution to the African conflict.

Sen. Clifford P. Case (N. J.), ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement that the administration should abandon any involvement in the Angolan civil war except for diplomacy.

"Our strategic interests are best served," said Case, "by leaving the Russians exposed high and dry as the major force intervening in Africa."

The United States is running the risk of "getting bogged down in a war by proxies and mercenaries," Case said, by "trying to superimpose the 'big picture' of American-Russian relations upon a fragmented tribal mosaic."

Administration strategists controlling U.S. policy refused to accept that portion of Case's premise yesterday, but they agreed with him that the main thrust of American strategy right now is diplomatic maneuver.

William E. Schaufele Jr., new assistant secretary of state for African affairs, is in Africa now in what amounts to a diplomatic race to line up support against Soviet strategy in Angola.

The testing time is the next two weeks. The foreign ministers of the 46-member Organization of African Unity will meet Jan. 8-10 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the Angolan conflict, and an OAU summit meeting of African leaders will be held Jan. 10-12.

Many experts in Africa are forecasting that the OAU meeting will produce formal diplomatic recognition of the Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the legitimate government of Angola.

"If that happens, that can make the U.S. involvement in Angola a lost cause," one American official acknowledged yesterday. The Schaufele mission is a major effort to head off such an outcome.

Schaufele conferred in Zaire on Saturday with President Mobutu Sese Seko, it was reported yesterday from Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire. Covert U. S. military aid is being channeled primarily through Zaire to the two anti-Communist factions fighting in Angola, the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

From Zaire, Schaufele is scheduled to proceed to Gabon, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, and possibly other nations regarded as specially concerned about the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola in support of the MPLA.

State Department spokesman John Trattner said yesterday, "Our primary objective is to end the fighting, obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and encourage the formation of a government

in Angola which represents all of the factions in the country."

At the same time, the Ford administration is continuing to channel into Angola, through the Central Intelligence Agency, previously authorized covert weapons aid for the anti-Communist forces.

In addition, the administration is continuing to put diplomatic pressure on countries that have provided, or may provide, air refueling for Cuban troops sent to Angola to help the MPLA. First the island nation of Barbados, and now Guyana, have received U. S. "expressions of concern."

The Senate on Dec. 19 voted against any further U. S. funds for covert use in Angola, after

\$32 million had been sent. This reportedly left \$5 million in the aide "pipeline" with \$3.2 million more for possible use from a CIA contingency fund. The House has yet to act on a cutoff.

A State Department spokesman yesterday denied that the Ford administration is trying to extract additional funds from Defense Department or other programs for use in Angola, without going through formal channels while Congress is in holiday recess.

The Dec. 19 Senate vote specifically denied use of \$9 million that was contained in a Defense Appropriations bill. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) tried to get a last-minute compromise on use of the \$9 million. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said that without it there would be no additional money to finance Angolan operations.

Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) said yesterday that if Kissinger used other funds for Angola he would be "violating his own statements" to the Senate leadership.

30 DEC 1975

(FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY continued from p. 2819)

## OPPONENTS MOVE TO BLOCK FURTHER ANGOLA AID

In less than two weeks, congressional unease over the Ford administration's policy of supplying military assistance to the anti-Soviet factions in the Angolan civil war has crystallized into a major effort to block further U.S. involvement in the conflict. The issue surfaced at several points in Congress:

- In the Senate, attempts to amend the defense appropriations bill to bar any further expenditures for Angolan factions triggered a Republican filibuster delaying final Senate action until Ford Dec. 19 relented and agreed to a vote. But the House delayed a final vote until January. (*Story, this page*)

- Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee approved amendments to the 1976 military aid bill that would require congressional authorization of any further aid. The Senate committee also approved a joint resolution to the same effect; a simple resolution urged Ford to use economic leverage against Soviet intervention. (*Story, p. 2833*)

- William E. Colby, outgoing director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was questioned about the merits of U.S. involvement and the extent of congressional consultation in his final appearance before the House Select Intelligence Committee Dec. 12. Colby insisted that the administration was in compliance with the law requiring that the appropriate congressional committees be informed of covert operations. (*Story, box, p. 2833*)

- George Bush encountered similar questions in Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on his nomination to succeed Colby as CIA director. Bush said he had not yet been briefed on the Angolan situation but that he opposed any requirement of prior congressional approval for covert operations. (*Story, p. 2816*)

### Developments

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Dec. 9 acknowledged that U.S. assistance was being channeled through neighboring states, presumably Zaire and Zambia, to curb the success of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (PMLA). Press reports setting the U.S. effort between \$25-million and \$50-million appeared Dec. 12. By Dec. 19, several attempts were under way to impose legislative curbs on further U.S. involvement. Administration supporters were filibustering the Senate during debate on the defense appropriations bill to block the most immediate threat to Ford's policy. Secretary Kissinger personally was spearheading a massive lobbying effort to preserve the administration's freedom of action.

### Administration Goals

The President, the secretary of state and the ubiquitous "high administration official" who invariably accompanies Kissinger have argued that the national interest forbids passivity in the face of a major new projection of Soviet influence beyond the traditional areas of Soviet concern. While they have not spelled out the possible consequences of failure to act, other administration sources have pointed to the risk that a Soviet-oriented Angolan regime might exacerbate the already explosive racial confrontation

in southern Africa. U.N. envoy Daniel P. Moynihan has argued, further, that a Soviet military presence in Angola would pose a potential threat to petroleum shipping lanes between the Middle East and nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

President Ford announced Dec. 16 that there was no thought of direct U.S. intervention. His spokesmen have insisted that the administration seeks only to create a military stalemate in Angola as the necessary prelude to a negotiated settlement.

### Opposition Views

The ghost of Vietnam past haunts congressional opponents of U.S. involvement. They find the administration's position unconvincing in the absence of any tangible strategic interest, and they doubt that a victorious PMLA would accept Soviet direction. They also fear the effect on relations with black Africa of U.S. association with the Union of South Africa, which has provided support to the two factions opposing PMLA.

Claims that the U.S. involvement will be limited recall similar statements in early stages of the Vietnam intervention. But some leading opponents of covert aid have indicated a willingness to consider some open assistance.

### Effort to Amend Defense Bill

Surfacing in front-page news articles Dec. 14, the Angolan issue landed on the Senate floor the following day, when Sen. John V. Tunney (D Calif.) and others demanded to know what funds in the fiscal 1976 defense appropriations bill (HR 9861) were earmarked or available for aiding the two U.S.-backed factions in the African nation's civil war. (*Provisions, conference action on defense bill, p. 2713*)

After Appropriations Chairman John L. McClellan (D Ark.) refused to provide this information, the Senate agreed to meet in secret session Dec. 17 to discuss the extent of U.S. involvement in Angola. "What we are doing in Angola is unknown to most Americans," declared Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.).

Throughout the week, senators opposing additional U.S. covert assistance to Angola argued that the United States was risking "another Vietnam-quagmire"; the factions involved in the civil war were too independent to allow the Soviet Union or any other nation to gain control of the nation, and U.S. policy leaders were poorly versed in African tribal disputes.

"For us to become involved when knowing so little [about Angola]...is just ridiculous," declared Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.).

Supporters of providing some assistance to the U.S.-backed Angolan factions generally expressed little enthusiasm for the administration's policy, but they refused to support a ban on covert aid, fearing such a move would lock the executive branch into an inflexible policy.

### Tunney, Griffith Amendments

Following the three-hour secret Senate session Dec. 17, Sen. Tunney introduced an amendment to cut \$33-million



from the defense bill, which he said was the amount recommended by the CIA to continue supplying aid for Angola. The amendment also placed a ban on the use of any additional funds "for any activities involving Angola directly or indirectly" (it was reported that much of the aid was being transported through neighboring Zaire), except for intelligence gathering. There were no funds in the bill earmarked for Angola, but the Tunney language was directed at still secret funding items appropriating money for CIA operations.

A substitute amendment was then offered by Robert P. Griffin (R Mich.) that barred expenditure of any fiscal 1976 defense funds to support U.S. combat operations "in or over or from off the shores of Angola." It allowed additional military grants to the U.S.-backed factions.

After a second Senate closed session Dec. 18, the Griffin amendment was overwhelmingly rejected, 26-72. Griffin had insisted that the nation should have some way to provide "assistance to the majority of the people of Africa who are resisting Soviet imperialism," but the Tunney coalition pointed out that the amendment was unnecessary because of the 1973 War Powers Act and that it skirted the main issue of military assistance and covert U.S. operations. A majority of Republicans (20) and 6 Democrats supported the Griffin language; 17 Republicans and 55 Democrats voted against it. (Vote 596, p. 2829)

To strip the Angola issue of some controversy, Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.), with Tunney's support, offered an amendment to retain the \$33-million in the defense bill, with the proviso that none of this amount or any other funds in HR 9861 could be used for any activities involving Angola. The amendment was approved 93-4. (Vote 597, p. 2829)

At this point, Mansfield made six unanimous consent requests to vote on the amended Tunney proposal, but Griffin objected each time. A White House-engineered filibuster against the amendment then began, continuing until the afternoon of Dec. 19 when President Ford reversed himself and called for a vote on the Angola issue to free the captive defense appropriations bill.

The Senate late Dec. 19 approved the Tunney amendment by a 54-22 vote. Prior to this vote, a motion to table the amendment failed 21-58. The measure then was sent to the House for approval in January, which would send the entire defense appropriations package to Ford.

## Resolutions on Angola

Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee acted during the week to show their displeasure with the U.S. role in Angola, approving amendments to the pending fiscal 1976 military and security-supporting aid bill. The amendments would have no effect until they were enacted—probably February at the earliest—but their supporters explained that they would prevent any prolonged secret involvement.

State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials briefed the Foreign Relations Committee Dec. 16 on U.S. activities, but members emerged from the closed session unhappy. "We are further down the road than we ever ought to have gone on Angola," said Sen. Frank Church (D Idaho). "We are on the road to an open-ended commitment."

Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.) said the committee members had agreed that any U.S. actions should be public, not covert, that every diplomatic effort should be made to stop a Soviet buildup, and that the Organization for African Unity (OAU) should be encouraged to become directly in-

## Reports on Covert Action

Under a year-old reporting procedure, six committees of Congress were aware of the U.S. involvement in the Angola civil war for some time before the revelations of early December.

An amendment to the 1974 foreign aid authorization bill required that the committees be informed of such activity. The amendment was sponsored in the Senate by Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa) and in the House by Leo J. Ryan (D Calif.). The Hughes-Ryan amendment required that no covert operations be carried out unless the President deems them important to the national security and that they be reported "in a timely fashion" to the appropriate congressional committees, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee. (1974 Almanac p. 533)

On Dec. 12, when CIA Director William E. Colby was questioned by members of the House Select Intelligence Committee about the agency's reported aid to factions in the Angolan civil war, he insisted that the Ford administration was in compliance with the reporting requirements of Section 662a of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Hughes-Ryan amendment).

Three committees in each chamber, together with the two Select Committees on Intelligence, are informed under terms of the provision. The six standing committees have different procedures for receiving the reports:

- In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Sparkman (D Ala.), ranking Republican Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and chief of the committee staff Pat M. Holt receive the briefing. Committee members are informed that a briefing has been received—though not its subject—and can request a briefing from Holt. Members of the committee staff responsible for the area are not briefed.

- The Senate Appropriations Committee receives the briefings through the five-member intelligence operations group of its Subcommittee on Defense. Members are told in advance what the briefing will be about. Staff members having security clearances are present.

- Information could not be obtained about Senate Armed Services Committee procedures.

- The House Armed Services Committee's Intelligence Subcommittee is notified of the subject in advance and staff members usually attend.

- The House Appropriation Subcommittee on Defense receives prior notification of the subject and cleared members of the staff are present.

- The House International Relations Committee receives the briefings through its Subcommittee on Oversight. Additional information could not be obtained.

volved in seeking an end to the fighting among the Angola factions. "We don't intend to let the Executive Branch just make this policy by itself," said Humphrey.

Acting on that sentiment, the committee adopted by voice vote Dec. 18 both an amendment to the pending military aid bill (S 2662) and a joint resolution (S J Res

156—S Rept 94-584) offered by Clark, Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.). Both would prohibit any assistance for covert operations or training for any Angolan movement unless specifically authorized by Congress; require unclassified reports by the President on any assistance he might desire to provide, including normal government-to-government assistance, and give either chamber 30 days to stop any aid. Humphrey's foreign aid subcommittee had approved the same language by a 7-0 vote Dec. 16.

A non-binding resolution (S Res 333) simply stating Senate sentiment was introduced Dec. 17 by Adlai E. Stevenson III (D Ill.), with influential co-sponsors such as Humphrey; Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine), chairman of the Budget Committee; Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.), assistant majority leader; and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.), ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. In language aimed at the Soviet Union and its grain purchases from this country, the resolution called upon the President to use his authority under the Export Administration Act to curtail exports to countries that persisted in intervening in Angola. Besides economic sanctions against countries intervening there, it urged OAU involvement, United Nations action and a suspension of further U.S. assistance.

In the House, the International Relations Committee adopted by voice vote Dec. 18 an amendment to its draft of the military aid bill that would prohibit any assistance to Angolan factions or other interests that might contribute to hostilities there. If the President determined U.S. assistance were necessary, he was to report publicly to Congress, but the exact proposal for action could be classified. Congress by concurrent resolution could block any proposal. Humanitarian assistance would be permitted. The President also was to report within 60 days on his diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. The committee specifically agreed that the amendment could be reconsidered when it continues markup of the draft legislation in January.

A more limiting amendment had been offered by Don Bonker (D Wash.), but the committee accepted changes offered by Dante B. Fascell (D Fla.) and Jonathan B. Bingham (D N.Y.).

Bonker later expressed frustration that the House could not take more binding and immediate action because of the lack of time before the Christmas recess.

On the Senate side, however, supporters of the Clark-Case-Javits amendment and joint resolution said they thought the Foreign Relations Committee's action would send a message to the President expressing congressional concern, and that the amendment to the military aid bill, if enacted, would prevent a lengthy or deepening involvement in Angola.

#### Pike Committee:

### INTELLIGENCE PROBE

Administration witnesses admitted before the House Select Intelligence Committee Dec. 17 that information indicating possible Soviet violations of the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT) had been withheld from regular intelligence channels. The witnesses insisted, however, that government officials with a "need to know" were always aware of these "hold" items and could find out through informal communications if they needed to.

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Retired Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, former chief of operations, Dec. 2 had accused Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of keeping relevant information from intelligence analysts in order to insulate the arms agreements from criticism. (*Weekly Report* p. 2645)

Ray S. Cline, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in 17 testimony generally concurred with Zumwalt's charges. He said that verification of SALT violations was extremely difficult at best and that the "hold" system exacerbated the problem.

Edward W. Proctor, CIA deputy director for intelligence, told the committee that senior Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA officials, including him, made the decisions on what intelligence data to place in "hold" status. He listed three reasons for doing this: 1) to allow clarification of the information's significance; 2) to forestall leaks that could jeopardize ongoing negotiations and risk compromising intelligence sources; and 3) to conform to an understanding reached with the Soviet government restricting public statements on any subject under active discussion in the SALT negotiations or in the Standstill Consultative Commission set up in 1972 to oversee compliance with the agreement.

"Hold" procedures had been used in the past, Proctor emphasized, citing as examples information relating to overflights of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and to the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962.

William G. Hyland, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs, insisted that as a practical matter the "hold" procedures could not keep any properly interested officials in ignorance of important information for any length of time. Informal communication within Washington's "SALT community" would prevent that, he said.

But Cline said that as a result of the "hold" procedures, key policymakers—including former Secretary of State William P. Rogers—were kept in the dark about Soviet moves for as long as several months. Cline argued for a more orderly examination of the various charges through regular channels at the National Security Council level. He warned that the "hold" procedure might permit officials with a personal and political stake in the success of SALT to obfuscate evidence of Soviet non-compliance.

In response to a question by committee member Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R Wis.), Hyland said he was not aware of any other areas currently subject to a "hold." He specifically denied that there had been any new restrictions on access to intelligence about Angola in recent months in the State Department's Intelligence and Research office, which Hyland headed until November.

#### Final Passage:

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Overriding administration opposition, the House Dec. 17 cleared for the President legislation (S 2350) adding a secretary of the Treasury as a member of the National Security Council. S 2350 was passed by the Senate Oct. 1975 and was reported (H Rept 94-730) without amendment to the House Armed Services Committee Dec. 15.

Presidents have differed widely in their use of the council, established by the National Security Act of 1947. In 1969 President Nixon and his assistant for national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, reorganized the council

general vesting options. Plans which do not pass the existing test may be granted caveated advance determinations and will be subject to a new test which is now being developed.

The concrete developments listed above evidence the willingness of the Commissioner to respond to the concerns of members of the Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee and of my colleague from the Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor Standards, the Honorable JOHN ERLÉNBERG, expressed in the course of the Oversight Subcommittee hearing of November 20, 1975. Commissioner Alexander and his able employee plans, technical, and Chief Counsel staffs have labored long and hard to make pension reform work for the working people of the Nation.

The complexity and scope of the pension law have made it necessary for the responsible Federal agencies, several committees and many interested Members of the Congress, and interested members of the public, to search together for answers. Much remains to be accomplished, and some things, such as the unfortunate practice of issuing final rules and forms without prior public notice and comment, need to be changed. However, the Commissioner's demonstrated willingness to modify burdensome requirements makes me confident that a most important program is in good hands, and that the promise of retirement security will become a reality for many millions of Americans.

#### RECORD STATEMENT ON ANGOLA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Ms. ABZUG) is recognized for 15 minutes.

**MS. ABZUG.** Mr. Speaker, it is increasingly apparent that the United States is directly involved in the military operations in Angola. The Ford administration has embarked upon this dangerous path without consultation with Congress or with the American people. It is clear, moreover, from the vote in the Senate today on the Tunney amendment, that the overwhelming majority of the Congress is opposed to the introduction of American aid in Angola, and would not have permitted the actions the American Government has already taken covertly if it had been consulted.

The involvement of the United States in the Angolan fighting is dangerous on several grounds:

First, it creates a superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in a region where no vital American interests exist. Edward Mulcahy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, admitted to Members of Congress yesterday in a briefing on Angola that the United States finds no special moral or ethical or political superiority in the UNITA or FNLA groups we support; we could as easily have supported the MPLA. Yet our response, according to Mulcahy, was made entirely because—we reflexively supported those whom the Soviets opposed. This is cynical cold war politics, and is both dangerous and mindless.

Second, it demonstrates that we have learned nothing from Vietnam and the debacle that occurred there. Again we are being asked to slowly escalate our commitment into a war far from our shores and in which America's vital interests are peripheral at best. We have no reason to believe that those whom we support will further the ideals of democracy and liberty for which this Nation should stand. We are continuing to funnel arms through third parties. We are using mercenary soldiers in our behalf, and white soldiers from openly racist South Africa. Thereby, we incite the resentment of all black Africa and of all the world.

If the position of the United States were openly calculated to lose us friends in the world, it could not have been more advantageous to that dismal cause. Already, we are hearing phony economic justifications for American involvement: Angola is rich in oil, diamonds, coffee. She is needed to provide port facilities for oil tankers. We are hearing tales of a new "domino" effect—if Angola falls, then Latin America is next. But these are false justifications of an already decided policy of military intervention.

Third, the U.S. administration has attempted to silence those in our Government who disagree and has deliberately opted against a diplomatic solution to the problems of Angola. The resignation of Assistant Secretary of State Davis this week is merely the tip of the iceberg of protest within the State Department against Secretary Kissinger's interventionist policies. A diplomatic alternative exists. The Organization of African Unity will meet in mid-January to consider the Angola fighting. The United Nations Security Council stands ready to assist. Perhaps multilateral discussions which involve all parties to the Angolan fighting are the answer. Perhaps other international mediation efforts will succeed. But the U.S. Government has used none of these techniques of helping to bring international disputes to resolution without bloodshed. It has instead used its considerable influence in world politics toward the option of interventionist warfare.

While we talk, the war goes on. We are reading reports today of South African mobilization, of further escalation of fighting, of the introduction of thousands of troops who have crossed the border from Zaire. The American escalation of its participation in this war goes on unabated. In this kind of conflict, it is necessary for Congress to act now to force the Ford administration to get American aid out of Angola, to move for a diplomatic and not a military solution to the Angolan question, before further escalation makes it almost impossible to extricate ourselves from Angola, as we found it impossible to extricate ourselves from Indochina without a humiliating military defeat.

#### CONSUMER VETO COVERUP

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANNUNZIO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

**MR. ANNUNZIO.** Mr. Speaker, in April

of this year the President directed the executive branch departments and agencies to develop consumer representation plans.

These plans had the supposed good intention of providing the consumer with greater access to the decisionmaking processes of those agencies. However, recently the plans have become available and I have a few thoughts on what I consider to be a public relations ploy to cover the President should he keep his promise to veto one of the most important pieces of consumer advocacy legislation to come out of the 94th Congress—The Consumer Protection Agency Act.

One of the strongest indications that these plans are not more than a window dressing is that none of the regulatory agencies are involved. This is an interesting fact when one considers the effect on consumers' lives such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission have via their power to interpret and enforce the laws passed by Congress.

The consumer has been clamoring for representation on the policymaking boards of these agencies for years and it is particularly insulting to him that those departments which perhaps matter most to his health, safety and pocketbook were not required to submit consumer representation plans.

The call to write the plans came after the release of a study by the Consumer Affairs Office of HEW which showed that the agencies were doing an unsatisfactory job of encouraging and using consumer input. The report listed several shortcomings such as inadequacy in dealing with telephone complaints, little or no policy analysis, and lack of public awareness as key reasons why consumers are not able to make an impact.

A followup phase of this study, which was to include more specific examples of the inadequacies encountered in the agencies, has conveniently been held up for months by a combination of late OMB approval and lack of funding.

As I read the consumer representation plans, I did not see a new determination on the part of these agencies to involve the consumer in policymaking decisions, but rather 17 dissertations on the rationale of old systems long proved inadequate. In only a few cases did an agency admit shortcomings and go as far as to propose changed programs; the others simply described and then added to existing plans.

Another reservation I have with these plans is the total absence of dollar figures in the reports. If the agencies were serious about change and actually planned to install the programs outlined, surely there would be some estimate of how much all this would cost. If no consideration to this has been given, then the length of time it will take to develop cost-effectiveness studies will again put the consumer off for months.

My feeling is that the President has trapped himself in his own argument that the proposed Consumer Protection